



In  m any respects ph ilosophy is no d ifferen t from  o th e r fields of knowledge, 
with perhaps one exception which, nonetheless, is of param ount im portance.
I have in m in d  the critical nature o f philosophy or, ra th e r, philosophical 
activity. N o m atte r how  we define philosophy and no  m atter from  which 
cu ltural trad ition  we com m ence our attem pts to determ ine what philosophy 
is, we are co n fro n ted  w ith the  fact tha t philosophy p ro p e r d oesn ’t exist if it 
d o esn ’t posses this self-reflective strain, i.e. o f being no t only a though t about 
the ex tan t reality  b u t also a critical th o u g h t abou t th inking as such.
After knowledge becam e thoroughly specialized in the 19th century and 
after A lthusser’s claim s in the  seventies tha t Marx discovered the co n tin en t 
o f the  science o f history, the  postm odern  turn  o f the early eighties b rough t 
with it n o t only the en d  o f the belief in to  the scientificity o f philosophical 
d isc o u rse  a n d  in to  its ep is te m o lo g ic a l su p p o r t  b u t  also a th o ro u g h  
reco n fig u ra tio n  o f  the  re la tionsh ip  betw een the na tu ra l and  the hum an 
sciences, ph ilosophy included . We could view philosophies such as P lato’s, 
late H e id eg g er’s, th a t o f  late M erleau-Ponty or the early Lyotard n o t only as 
efforts to  red u ce  the  d ifference betw een reflection an d  authenticity  b u t -  
som ehow  paradoxically -  also as philosophical attem pts to preclude the loss 
o f this critical edge n o t by retaining the distance required  by critical reflection 
b u t instead by collapsing critique and individual or social practice. Philosophy 
w hich w ent the  fa rthest in this direction was tha t o f the young Karl M arx 
a n d  his » c ritiq u e  o f  ev e ry th in g  existing« with its c o n tin u a tio n  in the  
u n d ertak in g s to m ateria lize theory  th rough  historical practice, an effort 
resu lting  in a sim ilar failure as attem pts o f Russian constructivism , Tatlin, 
an d  especially productivism , to materialize avant-garde art in utilitarian social 
practice. In  bo th  cases the  resu lt was the com plete loss o f the essence o f the 
prim ary activity. T h e  failure o f  such efforts reveals n o t only the impossibility 
o f carrying o u t such a p ro ject and  the need  to start the philosophical critique 
o f  know ledge an d  itself as its segm ent every time anew, b u t that a t the same 
tim e th e  n e e d  fo r th e  consciousness o f the  irreducib ility  of d ifferences 
betw een various spheres an d  realm s is required . T he collapsing o f various
Filozofski vestnik, X X  (2 /1999  - X IV  ICA), pp. 11-23. 11
Aleš Erjavec
spheres, the dedifferentiation, the desire to attain  the  u n d iffe ren tia ted  self 
and  the prim ord ial unity, are all parts o f  the  sam e im possible search  for a 
transparency and  a transform ation w ithou t a residue.
O ne o f the causes for such a desire  is the  very n a tu re  o f theo re tica l 
knowledge, philosophy included. Philosophy is an  activity spring ing  u p  from  
the G reek p reoccupation  with vision, from  the  p re d o m in a n ce  o f  ocular- 
cen trism ,1 to use M artin Jay’s term , a p reo ccu p a tio n  in h e re n t to the  G reek  
thought and  revealed, for example, in its language which abounds with visual 
m etaphors. Both features have given rise to the hypothesis th a t w ithou t such 
an ab u n d an ce  o f visual m etaphors and , generally  speaking , d ep e n d en ce  
upon vision, theory itself would n o t com e in to  being, fo r its em erg en ce  was 
essentially d ep e n d en t up o n  vision an d  the in h e re n t privilege this offers to 
static entities or im movable essences a t the  expense o f  the  flux o f chang ing  
phenom ena.
T h a t ph ilosophy em erged  w ithin  the  o cu la rcen tric  un iverse  o f  th e  
anc ien t G reece signifies, therefore, th a t the  significance assigned to static 
essences is a t the core o f philosophical activity, the m illennial history o f  which 
could also be perceived as a con tinuous effo rt to b rid g e  o r overcom e the 
gap betw een such static essences an d  w hat was perceived as a dynam ic o r 
dialectic flux of antagonism s o f history, society, an d  the h u m an  psyche.
2
A lthough postm odernity  and  postm odern ism  have lost m uch  o f  their 
p rev ious p u rp o r t  I view th ese  two n o tio n s  as h ig h ly  re le v a n t fo r  any  
contem porary  discussion o f philosophy an d  aesthetics. W hat I have in m ind  
can be illustrated best by quoting two authors, the first being W olfgang Welsch 
and  the o th e r Zygmunt Baum an. In an  influential artic le p u b lished  in  1988 
an d  titled  »M odernity and  Postm odern ity« , W elsch cla im ed  th a t, »Post­
m odernity  is traversed by the recognition  th a t totality c a n n o t arrive w ithou t 
establishing as an  absolute a certain  particularity  w hich is th en  inevitably 
tied to a destruction o f o ther particularities. [...] Postm odernity  begins w here 
totality ends.«2
1 Cf. M artinjay, Downcast Eyes. The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought 
(Berkeley: University of California Press 1993) and, especially, M artinjay, »The Rise of 
H erm eneutics and the Crisis of Ocularcentrism «, Force Fields (New York: Routledge 
1993), pp. 99-113.
2 Wolfgang Welsch, »Modernité et postm odernité«, Les cahiers de Philosophie (Postmoderne. 
Les termes d ’un usage), no. 6 (autom ne 1988), p. 33.
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A n o th er equally insightful observation was m ade a t approxim ately the 
sam e tim e by Z ygm unt B aum an. In his op in ion , »What has h ap p en ed  in 
re cen t years could  be articulated  as the appearance of a vantage po in t which 
allows th e  view o f  m o d ern ity  itself as an  enclosed  ob ject, an  essentially 
c o m p le te  p ro d u c t,  an  ep iso d e  o f h is to ry , w ith  an  e n d  as m u ch  as a 
beg in n in g .« 3 In  B au m an ’s view, which I find very congenial, m odern ity  is 
n o t  so m e th in g  th a t has actually  ended by th e  adven t o f  postm odern ity . 
P o stm o d ern ity  is in stead  charac te rized  exactly by the  em erg en ce  o f  the 
consciousness o f  a possible closure o f  m odernity  itself, o f  the consciousness 
o f  th e  possibility o f the en d  o f m odernity. Before, m odern ity  was viewed as a 
p ro jec t s tretch ing  in to  tem poral infinity; now it possesses a beginning as well 
as a possible end ing .
B oth W elsch and  B aum an -  as well as a series o f o th er thinkers -  viewed 
in the  eighties postm odern ity  as a positive no tion , replete with possibilities 
o ffered  by the em erg en ce  o f particularities, the newly atta ined  dignity o f 
which arose from  the ashes o f the now obsolete notion o f totality -  a process 
today visibly on  its way an d  at work already in Foucault’s book The Order of 
Things from  two decades earlier. T herein  the notion  o f totality was already 
s im u lta n e o u s ly  d e c o n s tr u c te d  a n d  re p la c e d  w ith  th e  new  o rd e r  o f  
d iscontinuities, with these being  closely related to particularities that Welsch 
m entions.
It is safe to assum e th a t the hum anities in general and  philosophy and  
aesthetics in particu lar fared  no  d ifferent than  o ther fields o f  knowledge. In 
all a tre n d  toward particu larization  developed in  the last two decades. If the 
in terna tional congresses o f aesthetics can serve as an indication o f what those 
o f  us w ho  tu rn  o u r  h e a d  w hen  som ebody  calls b e h in d  us, »Hey you, 
aesthetic ian!« , and  find ourselves in terpellated  into such a subject, do, we 
see th a t aesthetic ians over the world are m ainly concerned  with issues o f 
art, cu ltu re  and  beauty  (probably in this o rd er). Two o th e r facts are th a t 
with few exceptions the  con tem porary  postm odern  w orld an d  its com m u- 
nicational and  in fo rm atio n al p le th o ra  have m ade us n o t only to d ep en d  
u p o n  sim ilar re fe re n ces  a n d  o ften  w ork o n  re la ted  issues, b u t  th a t the 
p re v io u s  g lo b a l d iv is io n  in to  w h a t R ic h a rd  S h u s te rm a n  has ca lle d  
»philosophical em pires«4 -  b u t which could ju s t as easily be called »aesthetic 
em pires« -  is increasingly becom ing  a past phenom enon . G lobalization has
3 Zygmunt Bauman, Legislators and Interpreters (Cambridge: Polity, 1987), p. 117.
4 Cf. Richard Shusterm an, »Aesthetics Between Nationalism and Internationalism«, The 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 51:2, Spring 1993, p. 161. Cf. also Aleš Erjavec, 




affected n o t only products of mass p rod u c tio n  an d  consum ption  such as the 
globally m arketed  m aterial com m odities, b u t also sym bolic com m odities 
called theories, authors and  visions o f the world (o f visions du monde o f  which 
in the sixties Lucien G oldm ann w rote a b o u t) . In  the  w ords o f  W olfgang 
W elsch again , »Strictly speaking  th e re  is no  lo n g e r  an y th in g  abso lu te ly  
foreign.«5
O n e  o f  the fre q u e n t fea tu res assoc ia ted  w ith p o s tm o d e rn ity  is its 
p u rp o r te d  b reak  with the past. As I sk e tch ed  above, by u sing  B au m an ’s 
analysis, it would be m ore p ro p e r to claim  th a t postm odern ity  is the en d  o r 
the Ausgang o f modernity, although n o t exem plified by the ded ifferen tia tion /’ 
for this is to an excessive m easure d ep e n d en t u p o n  the early fascination with 
the purported ly  epochal break between m odern ity  and  postm odernity . This 
d ed iffe ren tia tio n  o f the previously a u to n o m o u s  sp h eres  sh o u ld  n o t  be  
equa ted  with particularization; the first den o tes  a d isin teg ra tio n  o f  fixed 
b o rd e rs  betw een  realm s, w hile the  seco n d  signals th e  e m e rg e n c e  o f  a 
situation which d o esn ’t allow for a totalizing elim ination  o f particu larities, 
for there no  longer exist a reductionist and  exclusivist com m on den o m in ato r
-  o r if it does, it exists only in the p lural form , as well as in  a transitory, an d  
hence a relative one.
I find  the no tion  o f postm odernity  as the p re sen t (an d  p erh ap s final) 
phase o f m odernity  o f relevance for it allows us to take in to  considera tion  
w hat are at the same time global social an d  h istorical processes an d  events 
a n d  s im u ltan e o u s ly  those  re s tr ic te d  to  th e  m u c h  n a r ro w e r  fie ld s  o f  
philosophical and aesthetic inquiry.
Am ong the generally accepted  features o f  postm odern ity  -  this b e in g  
tru e  also o f its ph ilosophical critics -  a re  a g lobaliza tion  o f  cu ltu re , the  
erosion o f the distinction betw een h igh  o r elite a rt an d  mass cu ltu re , etc. 
W hat is less frequently  n o ted  is th a t aesthetics an d  p h ilo sophy  too have 
ceased being pure academic endeavors and  are increasingly becom ing active 
ingred ien ts o f activities as varied as politics, design, an d  even forestry. We 
m ay w ell a rg u e  th a t som e o f  th ese  a p p lic a tio n s  o f  a e s th e tic s  m ay be 
problem atic, b u t we should nonetheless follow W ittgenste in ’s d ictum  th a t 
to know w hat a word m eans we should  look  how  it is used.
T hese may be  the m argins of ph ilosophy a n d  aesthetics. N onetheless, 
especially in the realm  o f w hat W olfgang W elsch has frequen tly  criticized as 
the »aestheticization o f everyday life« an d  its transm ogrification  in to  an  
in g red ien t o f  »experience«, hence chang ing  the  w orld in to  »a d om ain  o f
5 W olfgang W elsch, »Transculturality . T h e  C h an g in g  Form  o f C u ltu res  Today« 
(manuscript).
6 Cf. Scott Lash, Sociology o f Postmodernism (London: Routledge, 1990), esp. pp. 11-15.
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experience,«7 aesthetics and  theories linked to new forms o f com m unication 
an d  technolog ical m eans have h elped  establish these as radically d ifferent 
from  those o f  the  (mostly m odern ist) past. T he so-called »new media« and 
the eu p h o ria  associated with such technical and technological advancements 
have o ffe red  a new  field  o f  research , b u t a t the  sam e tim e h e ig h ten e d  
e x p e c ta t io n s  th a t  a c o m p le te ly  new  rea lm  o f  th e  ae s th e tic  a n d  th e  
ex p e rien ced  was in  the m aking. Even if this was n o t the case, it nonetheless 
h e lp ed  b ro ad en  (in a certa in  o r specialized field, b u t within the realm  o f 
the  social nonetheless) the ex tan t no tion  o f aesthetics.
W hat o ccu rred  in aesthetics resem bled developm ents in o th er realms 
o r areas o f know ledge: the  n o tion  of aesthetics com m enced to encom pass 
th eo re tica l activities o f E astern  cultures, the form er sociology o f culture, 
sem iotics, psychoanalysis an d  even ecology. Such b ro ad en in g  or extension 
o f the  m ean in g  o f the w ord was a positive p h enom enon , although it also 
instigated  the cu rre n t confusion and  increased vagueness o f the term. At an 
aesthetics co n feren ce  one  can find today papers on Plato, S ch o p en h au er’s 
aesthetics, the aesthetics of the stratosphere, soap operas, on Playboy bunnies, 
W ittgenstein  an d  dress codes in primitive or contem porary  societies.
D espite the  criticism  aim ed at in te rp re ta tio n  o f  postm odern ity  as a 
period  o f dedifferentiation , to a certain extent such a diagnosis merits further 
discussion. It is tru e  th a t aesthetics, for exam ple, is a typical discipline o f 
philosophy which cam e into existence as a consequence of the differentiation 
o ccu rrin g  w ithin m odern ity  and  that cu rren t b roaden ing  o f this no tion  is 
also a co n seq u en ce  o f  the  changed  circum stances in o u r organization o f 
knowledge.
T h a t this is possible is fu rth e rm o re  due to the undisputedly  increased 
perm eability  o f  the afo rem en tioned  »philosophical empires«: a few decades 
ago certa in  works o f ph ilosophy or aesthetics would patently  appear ou t o f 
place w ith in  a d iffe ren t cu ltu ra l or philosophical em pire: these could have 
b ee n  th e  case n o t only  w ith In d ian  works in a Polish env iro n m en t, for 
exam ple, b u t ju s t as well with French works in a British environm ent or British 
in a G erm an  o n e  an d  vice versa. N ot that m any classical works were n o t a 
p a r t  o f  th e  g lo b al c u ltu re , b u t they w ere th e re  e ith e r  as a p a r t o f  the  
ph ilosoph ical can o n  o r as a m arginal phenom enon . This is no longer so: 
today au tho rs from  various countries and  cultures em ploy similar o r same 
references and  are trea ting  theories n o t m uch differently from  cuisine or, 
to give a m ore elevated exam ple, literature o r the fine arts.
A n o th er reason  fo r such a situation is th a t aesthetics is increasingly an 
activity w hich strives to be to an  essential ex ten t related  to on-going hum an
7 W olfgang Welsch, Undoing Aesthetics (London: Sage, 1997), p. 2.
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practices. T hese are n o t necessarily artistic, b u t in m ost cases certain ly  are 
cultural ones. The sixties and seventies dem olished  the b arrie r betw een high 
and low in art. Special im port possessed structuralism  an d  re la ted  sem iotics 
which effectively re legated to oblivion the n o tio n  o f a r t as a p arad igm  o f 
creativity and  its m ost desired em anation. A rt now  becam e a slightly elevated 
realm  within the global sphere o f cu lture, with b o th  these term s o ften  being  
discarded as obsolete totalizing notions, to be  rep laced  with co n c re te  works 
and  the  signifying p ractices these o ffe red  an d  w ere th e  resu lts  of. T his 
viewpoint was supp lem ent by an o th e r one, nam ely th a t it was (neo ) avant- 
garde a rt which was acceptable for it avoided capitalist com m odification .
W hen in the eighties and  especially n ineties aesthetics, a rt an d  artw ork 
again com m enced  to gain theoretical in terest, w hat th en  ap p ea red  as the 
o b jec t o f  aesth e tic  in q u iry  b ecam e so b ro a d  th a t  it c a rr ie d  a lm o s t n o  
definable distinctions. T he no tion  o f ex p e rien ce  s ta rted  to seep  in to  the 
theoretic realm  o f aesthetics, while a rt becam e such an  ob lique en tity  th a t it 
could acquire almost any form, shape and  tem poral (and  especially transient) 
status. In such a situation the institutional theory  o f  a rt started  to be globally 
proliferated . At the time o f its fo rm ation  in  th e  sixties this theory  validly 
m irro red  the  New York a rt scene an d  aptly described  the way in w hich an  
artwork therein  came into existence an d  the m echanism s by w hich it ea rn ed  
appreciation. T he institu tional theory  fu rth e rm o re  signaled  the  dem ise o f  
norm ative aesthetics, a process which was s tren g th en ed  an d  g ained  global 
d im en sio n s as it sp read  to o th e r  artw o rld s. As B au m an  n o tic e d , » th e  
in stitu tional theory  o f  a r t (as an  in s titu tio n a l th eo ry  o f  any o th e r  value 
dom ain) sounds the death  knell to the ph ilosophers’ d ream  o f control. W hat 
has been p u t in the place of the absolute principles th a t only they h ad  access 
to and only they were able to operate, is this evasive, unwieldy, unpred ic tab le  
entity o f ‘consensus’. [...] W hat is new is n o t the  au thority  o f consensus, b u t 
the fact that the kind o f consensus which now seems to possess the reputation- 
bestowing authority  is n o t the consensus o f the  ph ilosophers.«8
Institutional theory o f art d etec ted  an d  articu la ted  a change w hich was 
in the sphere  o f art p ro p e r en g en d ered  m ainly by D ucham p an d  his artistic 
subversions. It nonetheless, in spite o f its lack o f norm ative founda tions, 
described possible artworlds which form ed relatively self-contained spheres, 
peopled  by the req u ired  inhabitan ts w ho to g e th er c rea ted  the  consensus 
m en tioned  by Baum an. W ith the advent o f  postm odern ism  a new  situation  
developed: art and culture have becom e so dem ocratized  an d  so w idespread 
that very often consensus is n o t even a ttem pted . T o  the au th o rs  an d  th e ir 
audiences suffices the act o f m aking and  th en  exh ib iting  o r show ing th e ir
8 Bauman, op. cit., p. 139.
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artifacts. W hat is o ccu rring  is no longer a process, the executors of which 
desire to have th e ir artifacts in tegra ted  into the ex tan t cu lture and  artworld 
an d  do  this e ith e r by assim ilating o r tearing down the o ld  norm s (a process 
the Czech aesthetic ian  Jan  Mukarovskÿ could in the thirties still describe as 
th e  p re d o m in a n t  in  a r t) ,  b u t in stead  an  act w hich req u ires  no  special 
a f firm a tio n  fro m  th e  b ro a d e r  society o r its segm en ts w hich a re  m o re  
artistically o r aesthetically inclined. Instead, the act of m aking appears almost 
id en tica l to  th e  ac t o f  co n su m p tio n . It is no  lo n g er im p o rtan t how the 
au d ien ce  will resp o n d  to a work, i.e. if, and  how, it will com m unicate with 
it; in stead  it is th e  creative experience which au then tica lly  represen ts the 
p u rp o rted ly  on to logical d im ension  o f such a work. We therefore speak of 
au to p o etics  w hich are  incom m ensurab le  and  no t subjected  to totalizing 
norm ative no tions an d  fram eworks. It is also for this reason  that the b o rd e r 
betw een a rt an d  n a tu re  is low ered or eradicated: if a work o f art can be any 
h u m an  artifact, it can also be any natural artifact, for no  spiritual dim ension 
is re q u ired  for its specific an d  distinct ontological status.
3
Institu tional theory  as a theoretical articulation o f the th en  ex tan t art 
offered  an  ap p ro p ria te  response to the artistic world o f the neo-avant-gardes 
o f the sixties an d  early seventies. As Baum an observed, it also revealed the 
fact th a t ph ilosophers, am ong  others, have lost their position as legislators 
and  were transform ed into interpreters. I wish to argue that u nder the present 
p o s tm o d e rn  c o n d itio n s , w hen  freq u en tly  th is sam e theo ry  is n o t only 
p ro life ra ted  fu r th e r b u t b ro ad en ed  and  applied  indiscrim inately, it may 
becom e again valid to  ascribe to  philosophers, aestheticians and others the 
ro le o f legislators, a lthough  this legislature can o f course no  longer be based 
on  tran scen d en t o r ideological foundations. I believe it is high time to do 
this, fo r the revolt against the fetish o f art has for a long  time now been  a 
victim  o f  its own success. T he cu rren t om nip resen t freedom  suffocates art 
an d  causes it to  becom e irrelevant, for it allows for any activity or object 
th a t a ce rta in  perso n  wishes to designate as such, to be called art hence 
effectively den ig ra tin g  its m eaningful signification.
As M ich el F o u c a u lt  o b serv ed  in  1983, o n e  o f  th e  g re a t ro les o f 
ph ilosophy »could be characterized  by saying that the task o f philosophy is 
to describe the  n a tu re  o f  the  presen t, and  o f ‘ourselves in  the p resen t’.«9
9 Q uoted  in M ichel Foucault, Politics. Philosophy. Culture. Interviews and Other Writings: 
1977 -  1984, ed ited  by Lawrence D. Kritzman (New York: Routledge, 1988), p. 36.
17
Aleš Erjavec
T he sam e should  be dem an d ed  o f aesthetics if it is to b e  a ph ilo soph ical 
aesthetics. I in te rp re t aesthetics prim arily  as a ph ilosophy  o f art. T his it can 
be  allow ing  an d  s u p p o r tin g  a t th e  sam e tim e  th e  e x is te n c e  o f  o th e r  
in terp re tations o f aesthetics, such as W elsch’s, fo r exam ple , who argues for 
an aesthetics which »will do justice to all usages o f the  expression .«10 W hile 
I fully agree with his W ittgensteinian in te rp re ta tio n  o f the term  a n d  o f its 
multifarious usages, it needs to be added  that Welsch at the sam e time elevates 
aesthetics to a p aram o u n t position w ithin philosophy, ascrib ing »aesthetic 
character« to cogn ition11 and  ascribing to ethics the  ro le  o f  »a subdiscip line 
of aesthetics«.12 W hat appears problem atic is n o t his b roaden ing  o f the no tion  
o f the aesthetic on to  various realm s o f h u m an  activity an d  n a tu re , etc., b u t 
his designation o f aesthetics as a ph ilosophical activity a im ed  a t a sim ilarly 
broad dom ain. It is this collapsing o f the aesthetic an d  o f  aesthetics th a t I find  
h a rd  to accept. A esthetics as p h ilo so p h y  o f  a r t  (a n d  p e rh a p s  c u ltu re )  
continues a long tradition , reach ing  back a t least to H egel. T h e  artistic is 
no t necessarily also the aesthetic, fo r a lth o u g h  th e  two overlap they a re  n o t 
identical. If  we limit aesthetics to the b ro ad  dom ain  o f  the aesthetic we loose 
a conceptual set o f tools which may enab le  us to analyze an d  evaluate the 
present-day artistic endeavors, in an a ttem p t to regain  the critical an d  hence 
necessarily also norm ative edge o f aesthe tic  p h ilo so p h ica l re flec tion . By 
opting  fo r such an aesthetics d irec ted  tow ards a r t I am  n o t p ro p a g a tin g  
aesthetic, philosophical or artistic exclusivism and  den ig ra tion  o f everything 
incom patible with whatever norm s are im posed by such an  aesthetics; I wish 
instead to re-establish art as a relatively d istinct p h en o m en o n  re q u ir in g  its 
relatively distinct theoretical reflection. This view is a corollary o f  a position  
which has recently  been  expressed also by A rth u r D anto . In  his o p in io n , 
»there is a kind o f transhistorical essence in art, everywhere an d  always the 
same, b u t it only discloses itself th ro u g h  history.«13
It w ould seem  tha t such a crite rion  proffers a sim ilar relativism  as is 
the one existing in the p resen t »artglobe«. This is n o t so, fo r while it is tru e  
that the viewjust described allows for an  infin ite variety o f artistic endeavors, 
it at the sam e time does n o t ascribe to all o f them  the nam e an d  h en ce  the 
status o f art. As stated before, there  is no  practical o r  theo re tical n eed  to do 
so, for the cu rren t practice in the in fin ite  n u m b er o f artw orlds o f  the  w orld 
is such th a t the »interesting« — of which H en ri Lefebvre w rote already in  the
10 Welsch, op. cit., p. 18.
11 Ibid., p. 22.
12 Ibid., p. 24.
13 A rthur Danto, After the End of Art. Contemporary Art and the Pale of History (Princeton, 
Mass.: Princeton University Press 1997), p. 28; cf. also p. 95.
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fifties -  has re p la ced  th e  »artistic«. I t is h igh  tim e to  re-evaluate certa in  
trad itio n a l values an d  regain  and  im plem ent their m eaning  and function, 
b u t this time, re ta in ing  also the consciousness o f their historical settings and 
the  d iffe ren ce  betw een  th em  and  those o f the p resen t. H ence a sim ilar 
consciousness, as th a t p erta in in g  to postm odern art, could  be im plem ented 
in  aesthetics (and  perhaps elsewhere): the consciousness o f contingency b u t 
a t the  sam e tim e o f the  n ee d  for certain  rules and  norm s, bo th  o f which 
m ay b e  re la tiv e  a n d  tra n s ie n t ,  n o t  d e p e n d e n t  u p o n  e ssen tia lis t an d  
tran scen d en t foundations, b u t upon  continuously and incessantly renew ed 
sim ilar o r  re la ted  co n d itio n s  o f  possibility. T he fear o f any norm ativity  
im posed  from  above o r b eh in d  is unw arranted, for it can n o t be p rom oted  
a n d  im p le m e n ted  u n d e r  p re sen t conditions. This may, finally, be w hat 
W olfgang W elsch p rom ulgates in his vision of the aesthetic, for his no tion  
to o  a sp ire s  to  a c e r ta in  u n iv e rsa lity  w hich  is p ro b a b ly  b u t a c e rta in  
anthropological o r hum an  condition, based on the view that »all ‘fundam ents’ 
d isp lay  an  a e s th e tic  c o u n te n a n c e  to g e th e r . O r, m o re  precisely: n o n ­
fu n d a m e n ta lism  m eans ju s t  this -  th a t the su p p o sed  ‘fu n d a m e n ts ’ are 
aesthetically constitu ted .«14
It now becom es clear why, according to Welsch, aesthetics can n o t be 
lim ited  to  a r t only: if it  w ould have been, it w ould om it the b roader spheres 
o f the aesthetic and  would, furtherm ore, include only those which are artistic 
b u t n o t necessarily aesthe tic .15
4
I w ant to suggest a so lution to the d ilem m a offered by W elsch, i.e. of 
choosing between aesthetics as a philosophy o f art and philosophy o f aisthesis. 
My answ er w ould th a t we can  have the pie and  ea t it, too. In  o th er words, I 
o p t fo r an  aesthetics u n d ers to o d  as a philosophy o f art, b u t a t the same time 
an aesthetics w hich can legitim ately attain and  carry o th e r m eanings which 
are  in m ultifarious ways connected  and  re la ted  to this concep t and  term . I 
wish to offer two in te rre la ted  reasons for such a designation o f aesthetics.
T he first concerns the concept o f transculturality as suggested by Welsch
14 »Transculturality«.
15 It should be noted in passing though, that the aesthetic -  as implied by Walter Benjamin, 
fo r exam ple -  may be a m uch m ore problem atic notion th a t the artistic, for the 
autonom y and therefore the consciousness of the value of the artistic is related also to 
the tradition  of the Enlightenm ent, while the notion of nature and the aesthetic as 
p roffered  by rom anticism  or M ichel Foucault, for that matter, i.e. as the m aking of 
the perfect self, bo th  carry with them  num erous dilemmas known from history.
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in the afore quo ted  essay. T he au th o r draws o u r a tten tio n  to  a curious fact 
related  to the reasons for his in tro d u ctio n  o f this concep t. H e writes: »The 
diagnosis o f  transculturality refers to a transition , o r to a phase in a process 
o f transition. It is a tem porary diagnosis. It takes the old  concep tion  o f  single 
cultures as its point of departure, and it argues that this conception -  although 
still seem ing self-evident to many people -  is no  longer descriptively adequate  
for m ost cu ltures today. Instead, the diagnosis o f  transcu ltu ra lity  views a 
p resen t and  fu ture states o f cultures w hich is no  lo n g er m o n o cu ltu ra l b u t 
cross-cultural. T he concep t seeks to conceptually  grasp this transition . [...] 
T he process o f tran sitio n  obviously im plies two m o m en ts: th e  o n g o in g  
existence o f  single cultures (or o f an o ld  u n d ers tan d in g  o f  c u ltu re ’s form ) 
and the shift to a new, transcultural form  o f cultures. W ith resp ect to this 
double character of the transition, it is conceptually sound and  even necessary 
to re fe r to single cu ltu res o f the  o ld  type as well as to p o in t th e  way to  
transculturality. «lfi
Why co u ld n ’t we m ake a sim ilar claim  -  with a slight twist, p erh ap s — 
concerning aesthetics? Aesthetics could then  be in terp re ted  as a b ro a d  notion
-  encom passing all p h en o m en a to which the adjective »aesthetic« cou ld  be 
assigned -  and, a t the same time, re ta in  o r ascribe to aesthetics the  m ean in g  
o f philosophy of art. It would then  be the tension  betw een these (an d  o th e r  
tentative) interpretations of aesthetics which would -  and  in fact do  -  together 
form  aesthetics as such. It would be this difference w hich w ould b e  essential, 
a d ifference arising also from  the historical situation  in  w hich it now  com es 
in to  being, a situation  exem plified  by this en o rm o u s  re co n fig u ra tio n  o f 
traditional taxonom ies. Aesthetics also is in a tem poral transitional stage, 
allowing for re in te rp re ta tio n  and  the  investm en t o f  new m ean ings. It is 
currently an  empty signifier akin to Fredric Jam eso n ’s »vanishing m ediator« , 
offering an  open ing  in the otherw ise firm  an d  h o m ogenous m em b ran e  o f 
discursive and  symbolic reality. It cu rren tly  deno tes w hat it has b een  in  the 
past and  w hat it could  deno te  in the fu tu re  -  if  we dec ide to in fluence the 
course o f  events.
My se c o n d  a rg u m e n t fo r  su ch  a lin e  o f  re a s o n in g  is r e la te d  to  
contem porary  events and  processes in a rt an d  cu lture . I claim ed befo re  th a t 
the p resen t situation in a rt and  cu lture is one  o f norm ative vacuity. I c an n o t 
offer h e re  extensive argum ents for such a sta tem ent, suffice it to say th a t in 
my view th e  p u rp o r te d ly  »cen tra l«  a rtis tic  ev en ts  -  ra n g in g  fro m  th e  
D ocum enta exhibitions in Kassel, th ro u g h  som e o f  the Venice b iennials o f  
this decade, to the 1997 »U3« exhibition in Ljubljana curated  by P eter W eibel
-  as well as certain  philosophical critiques o f such events, such as th a t o f
16 Welsch, »Transculturality«.
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Paul C row ther, for exam ple, in his m ost recen t book,17 all reveal the presen t 
in te rm ed ia ry  n a tu re  o f  o u r  global a rt and  cu lture, akin to the no tion  o f 
postm odern ism  an d  postm odern ity  as previously analyzed by Welsch and  
B aum an. C ould  we n o t claim  tha t the p resen t norm ative vacuity is in  fact 
c rea ted  by the  tran s itio n a l n a tu re  o f this very art, w here old  form s are 
acqu iring  new co n ten ts  an d  w here in a new reality we are in search o f new 
concepts? C ould  we n o t claim  th a t the p resen t ap p a ren t artistic uniform ity, 
arising from  the freedom  to assign the title or label of a rt to any phenom enon  
whatsoever, o ffering  the im pression o f a spen t natu re  o f the a rt events ju s t 
m en tioned , arises from  the old m odernist schem e or in terpre tation  of avant- 
g ard e  a r t w hich was aim ed — accord ing  to A dorno an d  the H aberm asian  
tradition  which was then  appropriated  by the artistic, curatorial and theoretic 
elite o f  the last two and  a h a lf decades -  a t defend ing  and  prom ulgating  
avant-garde a rt because o f  its authenticity  within the inau then tic  capitalist 
world? Could it n o t be argued  that the curren t cultural and artistic situation / 
s in the  w orld arise, on  the one  hand , from  their p ropensity  to m ultiply 
in fin ite ly  (h e n c e  re q u ir in g  an d  acq u irin g  local c h a ra c te r  an d  »local« 
evaluations) and, on  the o th er hand, from their continuous global and hence 
g e n e ra l o r  even u n ifo rm  p re sen ce  an d  existence? In sh o rt, from  th e ir 
transito ry  n a tu re , the  accrual o f  which exceeds that o f  the m odern ist past? 
T h a t th is is so a ttes t n o t only the m en tioned  dem ise o f concepts such as 
a lien a tio n  an d  re ification , b u t also requests for new cognitive m appings 
w ithin w hich a r t w ould again acquire its place.
W ithin  such a co n tex t it would o f course be e rroneous to require, as 
W elsch does, aesthetics to restric t and  »link the concep t of the aesthetic 
exclusively to the  province o f art and [to] w ant to fence it off com pletely 
from  daily life an d  the  living w orld partout, p racticing  [thus] aesthetic- 
theo re tical provincialism .«18 Aesthetics -  or, ra ther, aestheticians -  should 
becom e involved in art, practicing aesthetics in relation to and  in connection 
with a rt an d  cu ltu re  and  n o t exclusively isolate themselves within the towers 
o f the  academ ia, a practice often  carried ou t in the past19 and  im plied in the 
sta tem en t ju s t q u o ted  from  W elsch. Aesthetics as philosophy of art and  also 
o f cu ltu re  shou ld  develop as a relatively distinct theoretic activity, a lthough
17 Paul Crowther, The Language of Twentieth-Century Art (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1997).
18 Welsch, »Aestheticization Processes: Phenom ena, Distinctions and Prospects«, Theory, 
Culture &  Society, 13:1, February 1996, p. 11.
19 Symptomatic for such a situation within aesthetics was the fact that only in the late 
eighties did aestheticians at the international congress o f aesthetics find the concept 
of postm odernism , for exam ple, at all relevant for their discussions.
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still rem ain ing  a p art o f aesthetics, the  w hole o f this fo rm ing  the sam e big 
fam ily, usually  possessing  th e  n ecessa ry  fam ily  re se m b la n c e s . S u ch  a 
perm eability  of concepts has been  in  the h u m an ities  o ccu rrin g  fo r a few 
decades a t least, ranging  from  history an d  a r t history to philosophy.
W hich reasons should  p ro m p t aesthetics an d  aestheticians to acqu ire  
such an  activist role within the realm s o f a rt an d  culture?
First am ong these, since it is the m ost obvious, is the p resen t obsoleteness 
o f strict divisions am ong various social practices. Staying a lo o f in aesthetics 
or philosophy is today possible only if  we com pletely an d  consciously re trea t 
from  o u r everyday life which is globalized as never befo re  an d  in flu en ced  
by global and  local events and  inform ation  to an  equal if n o t g rea te r ex ten t.
T he second reason is the evaluative vacuity o f  co n tem p o rary  a rt scene 
and  the p rep o n d eran ce  o f watered-down, sim plified an d  nicely packaged  
philosophical and  aesthetic theories by theorists who d ro p  nam es, pick up  
artists and  discard criteria, all in the nam e o f com bat against the  obso lete  
danger o f fetishization and autonom ization o f  art. A reason  for such a course 
of events was also the self-critical stance o f philosophy, its decom position  
in to  v ario u s  th e o re tic a l  c u r re n ts ,  a n d  th e  g e n e ra l  ad v e rs ity  to w ard s 
norm ativi ty.
T he third reason is that art cannot be anything and  everything. If it wants 
to be som ething, be this som e-thing co n tin g en t as o th e r  p h en o m en a , us 
included, are, some sem blance o f criteria  have to be articu la ted . A relatively 
recen t a ttem pt in this direction was th a t o f  th e  » reen ch an tm en t o f  art«20 o r 
o f R ichard Shusterm an in his Pragmatist Aesthetics (1992) fo r exam ple, while 
the others that I am familiar with, are mostly continuations o f the m en tio n ed  
c o m b a t a g a in s t th e  p re s u m e d  d a n g e r  o f  a r t is t ic  fe t is h iz a t io n  a n d  
autonom ization. T he strength  o f such argum ents rests on the weakness an d  
absence o f any aesthetic theory attem pting  to argum entatively offer d ifferen t 
or opposed views -  or even strengthen  the one tha t I here  criticize. A possible 
argum ent against this th ird  reason could  be th a t a r t requ ires no  crite ria  and  
can actually be anything and everything. Such an  a rg u m en t is n o t h a rd  to 
dispute: every term , app lied  too broadly , looses its significance. Even in  
a n a rc h is t aesth e tic s  th e  c o n c e p t o p p o s e d  was n o t  th a t  o f  a r t, b u t  o f  
institu tionalized art, o f  a rt locked in m useum s an d  galleries, o f  a rt as an  
object in  contrast to art as an event. It is the c u rre n t »anything goes« slogan 
w hich co n trib u tes  to  the  c u r re n t  an a es th e tic iz a tio n  a n d  w hich  causes 
num erous contem porary  works to rem ain  expressive devices only, with no  
actual aesthetic or artistic value which bo th  are directly d e p e n d e n t u p o n  the




social resp o n se  o f the  au d ien ce , be it small o r large. T he resulting  void, 
besides being  filled by mass culture, is also being com pensated by traditional 
o r  classical a r t  w hich is an  object o f increased public interest.
T h e  fo u rth  an d  final reason, o r even causa finalis  maybe, is tha t art 
m atters, o r can m atter. If we are to retain  the no tion  o f  art for a specific and 
special realm  o f h u m an  activity which enables us to establish a specific form  
o f h u m an  intersubjectivity and, at the same time, enhances our self-awareness, 
be it in a conscious or corporeal way, art can retain its tentative role in hum an 
society an d  in individuals. This role can also be played by o th er social acts 
and  activities, b u t n o t equally well. It is -  or it could be -  up  to aesthetics to 
develop these notions, concepts and normative frameworks, n o t as som ething 
to b e  im posed  upon a r t -  this is n o t only undesirable b u t im possible — b u t as 
som eth in g  to be w orked on  together with art. It now becom es clear that any 
re levant aesthetics today m ust be linked to and involved with art.
In  the  p re sen t tran sien t period, characterized by a transculturality, a 
p le th o ra  o f re co n ce p tu a liz a tio n s , with the search  fo r new no tions and  
m appings with which to grasp o u r p resen t -  with p ro found  philosophical 
questions an d  challenges — a renew ed place should  be found  for aesthetics 
too. I o p t for an aesthetics which is strongly linked to philosophy, on the 
one  h an d , and  to art, on  the  o ther. O ther options are viable, valuable and 
valued. If, though , we ascribe to art an existential ro le  exceeding that o f 
quotid ian  aestheticization and  o f random ly feeding the Imaginary, aesthetics 
has to accep t a rt as its relevant, if n o t necessarily privileged object. Should 
we d ec id e  to  ascribe to  a r t such a place, we should  th en  also accept as one 
o f the  essential ones the  in terp re ta tio n  o f aesthetics as a philosophy o f art 
an d  cu ltu re .
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